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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A.,

Plaintiff and
Respondent
vs.

Case No. 1 7269

J. B. J. FEEDYARDS,

INC.,
a corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
DON ALLEN, dba MT. NEBO
CATTLE COMPANY, et al

Intervenors and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from portions of the Judgment granted
by the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, sitting by designation as Judge

of the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, on July 26, 1980, which denied an award of certain
claimed damages against Plaintiff-Respondent, arising out of an
alleged wrongful attachment of certain cattle.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial, submission of memoranda and oral argwnent,
the trial court granted a money judgment in favor of IntervenorsAppellants on some of their claims and denied judgment on the
other claims which are here under appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Intervenors-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment
insofar as it denied the award of additional damages in favor of
Intervenors against Plaintiff-Respondent.
This Court will observe that the present appeal is a
companion to Case No. 17270, wherein First Security is the
appellant as to the money judgment actually awarded against it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues presented by this appeal concern only the
alleged damage liability of Plaintiff-Respondent First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First Security") to the Intervenor, Don
Allen, d.b.a. Mt. Nebo Cattle Company, and his wife (for
convenience, the term "Intervenors• is used).

All other issues as

to all other parties have been previously decided.

Even though

this appeal is limited to the damages which the court below found
too speculative to support a judgment, a brief statement of the
principal background facts will be helpful to an understanding of
the issues presented.
On or about April 20, 1972, First Security made a series
of loans to J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc. for the financing of certain
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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!eeder animals (Tr. 486-489).
~omissory

These loans were evidenced by three

notes (Tr. 486-89; Exhibits A-42 to A-44) and were

;ecured by a series of properly perfected security interests in,
tnter alia, the cattle of J.B.J.
~49).

(Tr. 488, 489; Exhibits A-4S to

The loans totaled $218,200.00.
In the latter part of 1972 and early 1973 it became

apparent that the financial condition of J.B.J. was deteriorating
rapidly.

The notes were seriously delinquent (Tr. S02, S03,

Exhibit 60), J.B.J. became overdrawn in its checking account at
First Security by as much as $60,000.00 (Tr. SOO), and serious
shortages (approximately 39 2 animals) appeared in the inventories
~cattle

securing the notes (Tr. 494-SOO, S22).

It was also

apparent that the cattle kept at the J .B.J. Feedyards premises
were not being adequately cared for, and did not have sufficient
feed or medication.

Also, the corrals were an absolute quagmire

(Tr. 40S-410, Sll).

Dr. Jensen, the veterinarian, "felt sorry"

for the animals (Tr. 406).
In addition, First Security representatives saw that some
of the J .B.J. cattle carried two brands, including a strange
~and,

"VS" on the right ribs.

Many of the then recent sales of

J.B.J. cattle included animals bearing the VS brand (Tr. 102 and
Exhibits A-33 to A-37).

Upon checking, the Bank determined from

the state officials that such brand was registered to a "Mt. Nebo
Cattle Co.•, Goshen, Utah (Exh. A-3).

Mr. Broadbent of the Bank

asked Mr. Boswell (who was a •double agent• for both J .B.J. and
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Mt. Nebo) about the VS brand and was told it was Mr. Boswell's
brand.

Mr. Broadbent assumed that J.B.J., with management of

Boswell, was selling animals under a different name (Tr.
505,507).
242).

Mr. Boswell paid for and filed the registration (Tr.

At that time, no knowledge of Intervenors' interest was

held by First Security, and the public filings (Exh. A-3) showing
Mt. Nebo Cattle evidenced nothing by which Intervenors themselves
could be identified.

Two days after First Security filed the

attachment action, Mr. Broadbent learned of the claims of Don
Allen, Intervenor (Tr. 566) and the litigation proceeded to test
those claims.
Plaintiff commenced the initial action on February 7,
1973 to recover the sums owing by J.B.J. Feedyards.
38191, Fourth District Court for Utah County).

(Civil No.

On the same day,

it filed an appropriate Attachment Bond and Affidavit in Support
of Writ of Attachment, whereupon the Clerk of the Fourth Judicial
District Court duly issued a Writ of Attachment (R. 522).

The

Writ was thereafter levied by the Sheriff of Utah county upon
certain livestock located at the feedyards operated by J.B.J.

The

cattle were subsequently moved to the Lazy S Ranch, also in Utah
County, where the animals received care, medication and proper
feeding (R. 405-410, 436-440, 522).

The attachment was effected

only after consultation with the veterinarian who examined the
cattle (R. 405), and after the directors of J.B.J. had requested
that First Security take such action (R. 392; Exhibit A-41).
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On February 9, 1973, Intervenors were granted leave to
intervene in this action and filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of
Attachment, claiming that the cattle belonged to them and not to
J.B.J.

On or about February 21, 1973, all parties, including

rntervenors, stipulated that the livestock be sold for the highest
obtainable price, and that the funds be held awaiting disbursement
in accordance with the findings of the Court (Exhibit A-14).
On April 6, 1973, Intervenors' Motion to Quash Writ of
Attachment was granted.

The subject cattle were sold prior to

trial, and the proceeds were held, subject to the disposition
thereof according to the findings of the Court.

In the meantime,

Zions First National Bank filed suit against First Security,
claiming a security interest in the same cattle through
Intervenors (Civil No. 38327, Fourth District Court, Utah County,
State of Utah).
The trial was held in Civil No. 38327, wherein Judge
Ballif found and adjudged that all of the subject cattle belonged
to Intervenors.

The judgment was appealed by First Security to

the Utah Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial
rourt in Zions First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah,
~,

534 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975).

That decision specifically

reserved the issues presented in this appeal, i.e., whether
Intervenors are entitled to additional damages resulting from the
attachment.

-5-
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Subsequent to the Utah Supreme Court decision on the
prior issues, the Bank satisfied the judgment by paying to Zions
First National Bank and Intervenors, on May 16, 1975, the proceeds
from the sale of the cattle, less sums awarded by the Court to the
Bank as a setoff for costs incurred in feeding the cattle prior to
sale.

The discharge of that decree is evidenced by a Satisfaction

of Judgment signed by Zions Bank and Intervenors (R. 1649).
Important to the issues here is the fact that Intervenors or their
bank received the sum of $106,720.58 in May, 1975, representing
every penny of the net proceeds of the sale of the cattle
including interest to the date of satisfaction.

(That figure is

net of the feed bills paid by First Security to preserve the
animals.)
The trial giving rise to this appeal concerned only the
issue of whether First Security is liable to Intervenors for
damages resulting from the attachment in addition to the sale
proceeds already paid.

By Judgment dated July 26, 1980, the

Honorable Joseph I. Dimick found that First Security had acted
maliciously and without probable cause, and thus was liable for
damages to Intervenors as a result of the attachment.
Despite the generous nature of the damages which were
granted for what was clearly not a wrongful attachment as argued
in the companion brief of First Security as appellent (Case No.
17270), Intervenors seek to have this Court impose additional
damages which the lower court found conjectural and speculative.
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
COMMENTARY ON THE RECORD.
Plaintiff-Respondent First Security believes it will be
~seful

to the Court, in review of the lengthy Record before it, to

have this party's designation of those portions of the Record
which are most relevant.

The complexity requiring such

designation arises from the fact that the Record submitted by the
clerk of the lower court includes transcripts and pleadings from
the prior trial which are not really relevant to this appeal.

The

case designated below as Civil No. 38,327, Zions First National
~nk

vs. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., concerned the issue of

title to the cattle, was tried, appealed and disposed of, and the
judgment paid.

It is not helpful for the Court on the present

appeal to look at more than a few of the documents pertaining
thereto.
~e

Intervenors' Complaint and Petition for Damages on which

subject trial proceeded is part of the record (R. 1653), and

is to be deemed part of this case initiated by PlaintiffRespondent First Security Bank, No. 38,191 below (R. 164).

The

findings, conclusions, judgment (R. 1592) and satisfaction of
Judgment (R. 1649) are relevant, as in:
File No. 3, No. 38,327 Civil, Fourth District
Court, showing ink stamped pages 1579 to 1734.
Except as just noted, Respondent here submits that this Court
~ould

consider as immaterial to this appeal (and a waste of time
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to review) the volumes of the Record designated in the following
manner:
File No. l, No. 38,327 Civil, Fourth District
Court, Record on Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Utah, No. 13725, beginning with a title page
showing both a "l" and a "456" in ink stamped
page numbers;
File No. 2, No. 38,327 Civil, Fourth District
Court, Supreme Court No. 13725, beginning with a
pleading consisting of an Intervenor's Motion,
showing both a "219" and a "229" in ink stamped
page numbers.
Transcript of trial during various days from
January 2, 1974 to February 13, 1974: Vol. I,
showing pages 1-322 (typed) and pages 458-779
(ink stamped); Vol. II, showing pages 1-753
(typed) and pages 780-1210 (ink stamped); and
Vol. III, showing pages 1-1120 (typed) and pages
1211-1578 (ink stamped).
Respondent here further submits that the relevant
portions of the record to be reviewed as part of this appeal, and
to which citations are made in the briefs of the parties, and the
volumes designated in the following manner:
File No. l, No. 38,191 Civil, Fourth District
court, beginning with page l of the Complaint of
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., page ink
stamped "164", and ending with a minute entry
page ink stamped "333";
File No. 2, No. 38,191 Civil, Fourth District
Court, beginning with page 1 of an Intervenors'
Rebuttal Memorandum, ink stamped page "332", and
ending with a certificate page ink stamped "152";
File No. 3, No. 38,191 Civil, Fourth District
Court, beginning with a Title Page, Civil No.
38, 191, Supreme Court No. 17269, ink stamped
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page n1", and ending with a page of a stipulation and order ink stamped page •151"
Transcripts of trial proceedings December 11, 12
and 13, 1978: Vol. I, showing pages 1-191
(typed) and pages 615-805 (ink stamped)i Vol.
II, showing pages 191-A-604 (typed) and pages
806-1218 (ink stamped).
Various exhibits marked A-1 through A-78
pertaining to the foregoing.
Intervenors-Appellants and Plaintiff-Respondent refer to the
transcript of trial by the typed page numbers in their respective
briefs.
POINT II
THE ADDITIONAL DAMAGES CLAIMED BY INTERVENORS ARE
SPECULATIVE, CONJECTURAL AND EXCESSIVE.
It is not necessary to repeat here the arguments made by
First Security in its Appellant's brief in the companion case No.
17270.

The Court is already cognizant of the position taken by

First Security to the effect that the attachment of the cattle
which were later determined by the court to be those of
Intervenors was a good faith act of the Bank taken to protect
cattle which it then believed to be collateral to its loans to
J.B.J. Feedyards.

Based on that position and related arguments,

First Security bas asserted that no money judgment in favor of
lntervenors should have been rendered.

The argument here, in

contrast, proceeds on the assumption, arguendo, that even if the
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lower court's findings regarding a wrongful attachment were
correct as partially supporting the judgment now existing in favor
of Intervenors, the additional damages for which Intervenors seek
relief from this Court are so speculative, conjectural and
excessive as to be entirely outside the realm of propriety or
law.

Accordingly, those portions of the judgment appealed from

which denied the additional damages should be affirmed in all
respects.
The grounds for additional damages will be analyzed
separately as follows.
A.

Loss on attached Animals

Intervenors argue that due to the attachment of the
cattle and the subsequent theorized weight loss in moving the
cattle, that Intervenors' cattle were sold at a loss.

The trial

court was convinced that a preponderance of evidence did not
exist, and denied Intervenors' purported damages for this claim.
1.

The Applicable Law.

The law on this proposition is clear.

Unless it can be

shown by a preponderance of evidence that damage was actually
suffered, no damages will be awarded.
"Formerly the tendency was to restrict the
recovery to such matters as were susceptible of
having attached to them a pecuniary value, but
it is now generally held that the uncertainryreferred to is uncertainty as to fact of damage,
and not as to its amount • • • " (emphasis
added).
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Bee v. San Pedro and S.L.R. Company, 50 Utah 167, 167 P. 246, 253
(1917).
In a more recent case the Utah Supreme Court has stated,
"[D)amages to a business or enterprise need
only be proved with sufficient certainty that
reasonable minds might believe from a
preponderance of the evidence that the damages
were actually sufferred."
(emphasis added).
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 P2d 442, 445 (1973).
In order for Intervenors to recover the purported damages
for loss on attached animals they were required to demonstrate by
a preponderance of evidence that they actually suffered damages,
and with a reasonable amount of certainty the amount of damages
suffered.

The burden of proof was not met on either proposition.
2.

No Damage Occurred.

Intervenors were completely unable to show by any
credible evidence that damages even occurred.

Computations from

Exhibit A-16 show that the average weight of 210 bulls one week
before attachment was 1264 lbs.

At the time of sale after

attachment the average weight of these bulls was 1325 lbs.

This

means that from the period of time of one week before the
attachment to immediately after the sale the cattle had an average
iain of 61 pounds per animal.

When the Court observes from the

evidence the deplorable conditions in which the Bank found the
cattle prior to the attachment, with overcrowding, lack of

-11-
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sufficient feed, lack of proper medication, lack of proper
segregation, evidence of starvation and dead animals left in the
stockyard, it is very evident that Intervenors were not damaged by
the attachment and subsequent removal from the J.B.J. yards to
another feedyard where the cattle were cared for under supervision
of First Security.

In fact, Intervenors actually benefitted from

having the cattle attached and removed from J.B.J.'s guagmire to
the Lazy S yards where they gained an average of 61 pounds.

Had

the cattle remained in the J.B.J. properties the Intervenors'
investment in these cattle would have rapidly diminished.
In their Brief, Intervenors claim $28,929.48 as loss
(compared with $44,000.00 claimed in the original Petition for
Damages and $37,248.84 claimed in their memorandum after trial).
The most recently claimed figure apparently is derived from
testimony of Dr. Carpenter (Tr. 135-136) and the rough
calculations shown on the first page of Exhibit A-16.
Intervenors' figures are well founded.

None of

They seem to be created

from a combination of the supposed loss of weight and loss of sale
value, curiously gathered in a convoluted mix of logic and fact.
In order for the Court to follow the general ideas of Intervenors
and the counter-argument of Respondent herein, it is useful to
refer to the respective exhibits and to the original Findings of
Fact signed by Judge Ballif at the time he determined that the
attached cattle belonged to Intervenors (R. 1592).
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Finding No. 23 and paragraph 5 of the June 4, 1974,
Judgment (R. 1612) confirm that the subject attached cattle were
sold for $114,459.07.

The foregoing total of 266 can be

retabulated to show a total of 213 bulls, 22 cows, 21 steers and
10 heifers.

These are the only cattle with which the Court at any

time should be concerned.

Yet at the very outset of the analysis

of Intervenors' damage claims, we find a gross discrepancy on the
first page of Exhibit A-13 wherein some 282 head of cattle are
tabulated under the title of "Loss on Attached Animals", consisting of 222 bulls, 22 cows, 23 heifers and 15 steers.

This raises

the serious question at the outset as to whether Intervenors are
even discussing the same cattle in their evidence before the trial
court in this action.

But giving them some benefit of the doubt

regarding both mathematics and identification of cattle, we
proceed to demonstrate why Intervenors' claims are still
impossible.
3.

Purported Loss on Sale Value.

Intervenors' attempt at demonstrating damages isolated
214 bulls (which is only one more than the number tabulated in the
Findings of Fact).

Boswell's testimony was to the effect that the

pages of Exhibit A-16, consisting of weight slips and sale
documents, supported the information on which he and Intervenor
Don Allen and Dr. Alvin Carpenter based their testimony

-13-
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(Tr. 140).

Carpenter's calculations on the first page of Exhibit

A-13 as to weights and costs, however, differ from Carpenter's
calculations on Exhibit A-16.

Even Mr. Boswell admitted that he

could not explain the discrepancies (Tr. 147-148) and or.
Carpenter acknowledged that he relied on Boswell's figures (Tr.
163, 164, 168).

The cost figures on Exhibit A-13 have no

foundation or backup documentation or evidence whatever, thus
making them entirely unreliable.

The purported loss of $13,351.51

on 282 head of cattle cannot possibly relate to the 214 bulls or
the 266 cattle referred to in the Findings of Fact, and is simply
not supported by credible evidence.
A close study of all of the documentation in Exhibit A-13
and Exhibit A-16 will show that the conclusions reached in rough
form by Dr. Carpenter (Tr. 135-136) were based upon incorrect
evidence and faulty calculations.

Dr. Carpenter could not verify

weights on which he based conclusions, or even the dates the
animals were weighed (Tr. 170).

The following discussion and

tabulations will demonstrate that point very convincingly.
An examination of Exhibit A-13 and the backup documents
thereto show that Intervenors' attempt to demonstrate the cost
(and the purported dollar loss) of the attached animals creates
many more questions than can be answered thereby.

The invoices

from which the cost figures are supposedly taken are invoices or
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shipping memoranda during the month of January, 1973, from Don
~llen

Livestock to Mt. Nebo Cattle Company, covering some 533

animals, of which 317 were shipped to the feedyards operated by
J.B.J.

Of that latter number, 239 bulls were shipped to the

J.B.J. yards.

It is assumed by Intervenors that some of the

animals which were attached were the same animals thus shipped by

Don Allen, but no other evidence really tied the two groups of
animals together.

Aside from that uncertainty, however, it

clearly appears from the tabulation of the backup documents from
Exhibit A-13, that after excluding the animals shipped to packers
and other destinations, and also excluding the animals other than
the bulls, a total of 239 bulls was received at the J.B.J.
Feedyards, costing a total of $100,292.62, or an average cost of
1419.63 per bull.

Comparing that figure with the Findings of

Fact, it will be seen that the 266 animals enumerated therein as
1ttached animals were sold for a total price of $114,459.07, or an
1verage sale price of $430.30.

Comparing that with the average

rost, it shows that Intervenors actually realized a gain of $10.67
~r

head on the animals, even assuming, arguendo, that the bulls

m Exhibit A-13 are the same bulls in part which were made the
subject of attachment.

These figures are from Intervenors' own

evidence, or from the prior findings of the court, and are not
subject to any other interpretation in favor of Intervenors.

-15-
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following tabulation shows that the evidence presented by
Intervenors in Exhibit A-13 simply did not support the claims made
regarding a possible loss of the sale of the cattle.

Intervenors

did not take the occasion to analyze their own evidence carefully
enough to see that their evidence disproved their own case:

SUMMARY OF COST OF CATTLE SHIPPED TO J.B.J.
FEEDYARDS PER EXHIBIT A-13 BACKUP DOCUMENTS
ANIMALS SENT TO FEEDYARD
Ref.
No.

1973
Date

9001
9002
9003
9004
9065
9006
9007
9008
9009
9010
9011
9012
9013
9014

1/15
1/11
1/12
1/12
1/18
1/18
1/20
1/20
1/20
1/23
1/23
1/23
1/27
1/16

Bulls

Other

19
19
26
30
34
27
35
31

18
22

18

26

7
5

Total
Invoice
Cost
$15,267.87
15,467.67
14,431.02
14,835.84
14, 051. 66
13,741.24
16,131.26
15,176.09
N/A
12,616.53
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

239
$100,292.62 divided by 239

Memo of
No. Shipped
Elsewhere

Total Cost
of Bulls
in Feedyards
$

11

30

7,840.25
7,167.94
10,140.78
12,029.06
15, 051. 66
11,594.17
16, 131. 26
15,176.09
5,161.31

52
41

81
l

216

$100,292.62

$419.63 average cost of bulls

From Findings of Fact:
266 animals sold for $114,459.07 - $430.30 average sale
price or gain of $10.67 per head
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4.

Purported Loss on Weight.

A similar analysis with reference to the weight loss
claimed under Exhibit A-16 will show that the documents disprove
rather than prove the claims of Intervenors.

Dr. Carpenter's

claim that the attached animals weighed 1,369 pounds each, on the
average, and were sold at a weight of 1,325 pounds each, is again
a conclusion based upon faulty documentation.

The weight slips on

which both Dr. Carpenter and Mr. Boswell relied as part of Exhibit
A-16 show that all of the bulls weighed therein totaled 210 in
number and 265,475 pounds aggregate, for an average weight of
1,264 pounds per head.

There is absolutely no evidence whatever

supporting Dr. Carpenter's calculation of 1,369 pounds per head at
the time of the attachment.

The sales invoices which are part of

Exhibit A-16 are probably more reliable, since they came from
Producers Livestock Marketing Association, an independent cattle
auction, and were not manufactured by Intervenors.

Using the

computation of 1,325 pounds per animal average weight at the time
of sale after attachment by First Security Bank, and comparing
that figure with the correctly tabulated average weight of 1,264
pounds per head approximately one week before that attachment, it
will easily be seen that the cattle had an average weight gain of
61 pounds per animal between the time of the January 31, 1973,

inventory, and the subsequent sales after the attachment.

Once

again, therefore, Intervenors benefitted from the care of the
animals by the Bank, rather than receiving a loss thereon.
-17-
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ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTS AND COUNTS OF ANIMALS
PER WEIGHT SLIPS PART OF EXHIBIT A-16
Fat
Bulls

Feeder
Bulls

Weights in Lbs.
Bulls Only

10
12
12
10
18

10

13

Heifers, Cows
and Steers

15,760
14,940
14,600
12,240
17,955
12,550
18,570
10

11

9,980
ll, 490
13,390
15,650

15
8

19,290
18,900
8,810

8
9
ll
16

12
10
ll
10
4

73

137

Other Weights
in Lbs.

14,600
13,430
14,650
12,400
6,280
265,475 lbs.

10,270

8

7, 710

14

13,030

22

22,800

11

9,780
63,590 lbs.

65

73
137
Total bulls 210 - 1264 lbs. average weight prior to attachment
From Exhibit A-16

average weight upon sale of cattle was 1325
lbs., thus showing an average weight gain of
61 lbs. per animal.

Since both the weight differential and the price
differential are properly computed in favor of First Security's
defenses and against the claims of Intervenors, it must be
concluded by the Court that Intervenors suffered no loss whatever
by reason of the attachment, care and subsequent sale of the
cattle by the Bank.

Therefore, the trial court's determination
-18-
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:hat damages for this claim should not be granted must be upheld

w the

Utah Supreme Court.
B.

Loss on Forced Sale of Central Montana Livestock
Company.

Here we find an item of damages set forth for the first
time at trial and not contained in Intervenors' Petition for
Damages or Pre-Trial Statement of Facts.
disallowed for that reason alone.

The claim should be

Additional conunents are

appropriate, however, on the merits (or lack of merit) of the
claim.
Intervenors allege that they were forced to sell a
trading company at a loss because all their working capital was
Ued up in Utah as a result of the attachment of their cattle.
Intervenors cite no legal authority for this assertion in their
~ief

to this Court.
Damages will be rejected as speculative, remote or

conjectural unless the cause of these damages can be ascertained
iith reasonable certainty.
~utomobile

~lorado

The court in Donahue v. Pikes Peak

Co., 150 Colo. 281, 372 P2d 443 (1962), citing from

National Bank v. Ashcraft, 83 Colo. 136, 263 P.23 (1928)

1hich in turn quoted with approval from Rule v. McGregor, 117 Iowa
H9, 90 N.W. 811 (1902), said,
Uncertainty as to the amount of damages is not
an obstacle in the way of their allowance.
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Uncertainty as to the cause from which they
proceed is what has occasioned trouble, and only
when it cannot be ascertained with reasonable
certainty that these have sprung from the breach
alleged are they to be rejected as too remote,
or conjectural or speculative (emphasis added).
372 P.2d at 447.
In this fact situation the cause of the sale for a loss,
if there was a loss at all, cannot be ascertained with reasonable
certainty and the damages claimed are, therefore, speculative.
The sale of the attached cattle, which sale was approved in
substance by the Intervenors in a stipulation (Exhibit A-14),
occurred in the early part of 1973.

The proceeds of this sale,

less a court approved setoff for feed purchased to sustain and
nourish the cattle, were deposited with the lower court pending
the outcome of the prior litigation.

At the conclusion of that

litigation the sum of $106,720.58 representing such net proceeds
was promptly handed over to Intervenors in May of 1975 (R. 1649).
The livestock auction was sold in 1977 or the first part of 1978
(Tr. 348).

Intervenors claim that "working capital" tied up and

later paid as sale proceeds in May of 1975 caused the disposition,
at a loss, of the auction business in 1977 or 1978.
However, Intervenors admitted that other factors related
to the decrease in cattle sales and profitability of the auction,
such as adverse financial transactions with one David Pedley,
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heavy obligations on the ranch and the business, adverse business
conditions, as well as the lack of capital (Tr. 349).

The gap in

time between the time the $106,720.58 was paid to Intervenors and
the time of sale of the auction was at least a year and a half,
and at most two and a half years, during which time any one of a
nwnber of factors could have caused the sale.

It cannot be

stated, and was not stated with reasonable certainty by
Intervenors, that they were forced to sell the auction in 1977 or
1978, on the ground that they didn't receive the proceeds from the

sale of the cattle prior to 1975.
Even assuming that by some stretch of mental processes
it could be shown by Intervenors that the attachment of cattle in
1973 caused the forced sale of the auction in 1977 or 1978, the

measure of damages sought is totally inappropriate.

The figure

of $76,950.94 was reached by taking the "cost" of the company,
i116,950.94, and subtracting from that the sale price of

approximately $100,000.00.

Interestingly enough, official

reports to a government agency (Exhibit A-21) show the Intervenors
carrying the auction as an asset valued at $166,000.00 in 1972,
H66,000.00 in 1973, $110,000.00 in 1974 and $124,000.00 in 1975.

None of these figures correspond in any degree with the claim that
the company "cost" $176,950.94 contrasted with the alleged sale
~ice

of $100,000.00.
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Another point becomes painfully evident.

Even assuming

that Intervenors had made some connection between the proceeds of
the cattle received in May, 1975, and the working capital needed
for the auction business (which connection was never made in the
evidence), it is clear that it would have been the same fund of
working capital which Intervenors also claim was necessary for the
business of buying and selling livestock and, in part, the
purported commodity market transactions.

This court cannot

countenance an attempt to seek damages where the Intervenors think
they could have used the same fund of money three different places
at the same time!

c.

Lost Business Opportunities in Trading Livestock in
Montana.

Intervenors claims that sales in livestock trading had
increased every year up until the year of attachment.

The year

after the attachment sales were cut in half and in each succeeding
year sales decreased.

Intervenors estimate that they lost trades

of 83,717 head of cattle over the period in question and that the
•conservative" gross profit on each head of cattle was $8.00.

As

with the preceding claim, no legal authority is cited for the
proposition, only that, "this is not speculation as to either the
fact of damage or the amount of the damage.•
brief)

(P.26 of Intervenors'

The trial court awarded $126,000.00, plus prejudgment

interest of $39,574.80.

By asking for another $514,207.24,
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Intervenors apparently believe that by continuing to escalate the
astronomical estimates of damages, the legal foundation therefor
will somehow improve.
The law in Utah reflects an aversion to speculation about
lost anticipated profits.

The exact amount of lost profits does

not have to be shown precisely, but there must be a reasonable
basis for their estimation, as well as their foreseeability and
causation by First Security Bank.
The basis and general rule is that loss of
anticipated profits of a business venture
involve so many factors of uncertainty that
ordinarily profits to be realized in the future
are too speculative to base an award of damages
thereon. The other side of the coin is that the
damages to a business or enterprise need only be
proved with sufficient certainty that reasonable
minds might believe from a preponderance of the
evidence that the damages were actually suffered.
~warth

11973)

v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 187, 515 P.2d 442, 445
(claim for lost profits from Christmas tree venture

considered too speculative to be submitted to jury).

Accord,

Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah
2d 187, 194, 309 P.2d 802, 806-07

(1957)

(plaintiff's claim for

lost profits due to telephone directory error rejected as
speculative without proof of particular lost clients); United

.

States v. Griffith, Cornall & Carman, Inc., 210 F.2d 11, 13 (10th
Cir. 1954)

(corporation's evidence of lost profits due to

government's negligence considered speculative and claim denied);
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Devries v. Starr, 393 F.2d 9, 14-20 (1968)

(lost profits awarded

only where plaintiff's business was predictable and elements of
prediction were well-documented.)
Courts of other jurisdictions have held that in order for
anticipated profits to be claimed as an element of damages the
business claimed to have been interrupted must be an established
one and it must have been successfully conducted in order to
ascertain the lost profits.
"In 25 C.J.S, Damages, § 42b p. 518, it is
stated that in cases where the loss of
anticipated profits is claimed to have been
interrupted it must be an established one, and
it must be shown that it has been successfully
conducted for such a length of time and has such
a trade established that the profits therefrom
are reasonably ascertainable.
(emphasis added)
Dieffenbach v. Mcintyre, 254 P. 2d 346, 349 (Okla. 1953).
Intervenors have again failed to show causation between
the effects of the attachment and the alleged loss of sale of
83,717 head of cattle.

Intervenors would have this Court believe

that the attachment of 266 cattle in 1973 brought about the sales
loss of 83,717 head of cattle.

As mentioned earlier, Intervenors

admitted that other factors related to the decrease in the cattle
sales (Tr. 349).

Intervenors simply cannot talk this Court into

believing that the adverse results of the attachment, for which
the Intervenors were ultimately paid every dollar in May 1975,
represented the only negative factor in the cattle business for
Intervenors during the succeeding years.
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Even if the court were to find that the effects of the
attachment proximately caused the lost business opportunities or
anticipated profits, the damages claimed are far too speculative.
The calculations and evidence presented by Intervenors are
incapable of convincing reasonable minds with any degree of
certainty that these damages were actually suffered by the
Intervenors.

The hard evidence painfully but surely brings death

to the damages computations which so mercilessly burden the record.
In the initial testimony of Intervenor Don Allen, and the
corresponding testimony of Dr. Carpenter, it appeared that the
damage figures testified to regarding livestock sales represented
a "net profit" projection of $8.00 per head (Tr. 205).

However,

upon cross-examination, Don Allen admitted that such figures were
"gross profit" figures, and that expenses would have to be
deducted from such gross profits (Tr. 354).

Yet at no time did

Intervenors attempt to modify the astronomical gross prof it
projections by any meaningful expense projections, thus making the
profit projections entirely unrealistic ab initiol
The absence of any evidence whatsoever to support the
$8.00 figure completely undermines the foundation for the
testimony of Dr. Carpenter, and also renders thoroughly unreliable
the testimony of Intervenor Don Allen, so far as the damage
computations are concerned.
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ANALYSIS OF NET PROFITS FROM
LIVESTOCK TRADING PER EXHIBIT A-21

Year

Gross Value
of Livestock
Purchased

Gross
Dealer
Profit

No. Of
Animals
Sold

Ex12enses

Net
Profit

1972

$5,004,877.75

$181,614.11
Average:
$3.91

46,500

$167,154.36

$14,459.75

1973

$5,083,456.20

$136,679.00
Average:
$6.20

22,053

$150,130.29

($13, 451. 29)

1974

$4,289,444.67

$ 87,346.00
Average:
$4.63

18,876

$132,553.00

($42,207.00)

1975

$2,818,359.11

$ 22,567.10
Average:
$1.52

14,854

$128,805.41

($83,022.06)

The $8.00 per head gross profit figure used by Intervenors
(brief, pg. 26) is patently absurd.

Analysis of Exhibit A-21

demonstrates that the gross dealer profit, divided by the number
of animals sold, ranged from a low of $1.52 in 1975 to a high of
$6.20 in 1973.

In 1972, the year before the attachment, before

any of the alleged effects of the attachment took place, the gross
profit figure was only $3.91, a far cry from the "conservative"
$8.00 gross profit figure advanced as legitimate by Intervenors.
Moreover, the 30% expense figure arbitrarily used to
subtract from the "conservative" $8.00 gross profit figure has
absolutely no foundation.

Again, Exhibit A-21 graphically points

out how low the 30% expense figure used by the Intervenors is.

-26Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The percentage of expenses to gross dealer profit ranged from a
~of

92.03% in 1972 to a 570.7% figure in 1975.

The 1972

expense to gross profit figure of 92.03% is more than three times
the figure used by Intervenors to calculate the anticipated
profits they seek to recover as damages.

The 30% figure used in

the brief defies reason and has absolutely no basis in past
performance for credible use in a damage calculation.
The Intervenors' brief (p. 14) graciously admits that
Intervenors did not show a high net profit in 1972 or in 1973, and
a quick perusal of Exhibit A-21 reveals that a net profit wasn't
achieved in either 1974 or 1975.

In order to recover anticipatory

damages, one must reasonably expect to make profits in the
future.

The years 1972 through 1974 show a miserable track record

in regard to net profits.

As was stated in the Oklahoma case

Diffenbach v. Mcintyre, supra, pg. 24, in order for loss of
profits to be recovered as damages R(i]t must be shown that it has
~en

successfully conducted for such a length of time and has such

a trade established that the profits therefrom are reasonably
~certainable."

Phrased another way, in 1972, the year before the
attachment and the year of the highest volume of livestock sold by
Intervenors, a net profit of only $14,459.75 was realized.

Yet

Intervenors would have us believe that if not for the attachment,
they could have earned somewhere between $400,000.00 and
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$670,000.00 over the next three years in following the same
business!

Such claim is patently absurd.
The lost business opportunities or anticipated profits

damages sought by Intervenors should not be awarded because, 1) it
has not been shown with a reasonable certainty that the effects of
the attachment in fact caused the decline in sales; 2) the figures
used by Intervenors to calculate these damages have no basis in
fact or logic; and 3) The court cannot award damages for
anticipated profits, when the Intervenors have not demonstrated
the prior ability to have a consistent profit-making concern.
D.

Loss on Prospective Future Commodity Market
Transaction

Intervenors allege that they entered into an enforceable
contract with a broker to invest $10,000.00 in the cattle futures
commodity market right after the Bank released its attachment of
the cattle.

Dr. Carpenter testified that if the Intervenors had

made the investment, they would have made an astounding
$926,608.00 profit!

The trial court, realizing the blantantly

speculative nature of damages sought in this claim, declined to
award a judgment.

Nevertheless, Intervenors continue to press

this conjectural claim.
Respondent must comment that the purported damages
arising from the •phantom" commodities market transactions are
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those which should be most shocking to the conscience of the
court.

For Intervenors to claim that with a $10,000.00 investment

in February, 1973, profits of $926,608.00 would have been realized
in the ensuing months, is so incredulous as to defy the
imagination.
1.

The Court must consider:
Intervenor Don Allen had never engaged in the

commodities futures market in the past, and, therefore, had no
established business and no experience on which he could base his
speculation as to when he might have bought and sold the futures
contracts (Tr. 57).
2.

The stockbroker, Bert Thurber, described the rather

casual discussions in which he had engaged with Intervenor Don
Allen concerning the possibility of a futures commodity
investment.

Thurber himself was not licensed as a broker in that

business at the time.

On what was purported to be an oral

contract, unenforceable because of the statute of frauds, as well
as other reasons, Don Allen expressed his desire to invest
$10,000.00, contingent upon his receipt of that money from Utah or
some other source.

When asked why the brokerage firm did not seek

to enforce the purported contract against Don Allen, when he
failed to invest the $10,000.00, Thurber clearly stated as his
last response in the cross-examination:
(Tr. 116).

"He had no obligation•

That admission alone completely destroys the
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supposition of Intervenors that any damage claim can be built upon
an unenforceable non-obligatory discussion about the possibility
of a commodities market investment.
3.

Even assuming, without admission, that some kind of a

contract was entered into relating to the commodities futures
transaction, computing any possible profits therefrom assumes so
many variables that the evidence becomes speculative and
conjectural beyond belief.

Nothing whatsoever was forseeable.

All of the witnesses testifying on this matter, Don Allen, Bert
Thurber and Alvin Carpenter, agreed that no person could have
known in advance of the proper time to purchase, sell, and
purchase again the various commodities contracts which would be
involved, for the purpose of realizing the profits now claimed by
Intervenors (Tr. 353).

The damages computations were based upon

the supposition that Don Allen would enter the market in February
of 1973, sell the contracts in August, 1973, and make his first
profiti re-enter the market again on the down side of the
commodities futures, and sell all of the contracts in April, 1974,
at which time another profit would supposedly have been realized
(Tr. 178, 352).

Neither the court nor the witnesses could

possibly believe that the parties contemplated in February, 1973,
at the time of the loose talk concerning a $10,000.00 possible
investment, that either Don Allen or the brokerage firm would be
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able to have such powers of future prediction as to be able to
enter the market, sell again, re-enter and sell again at all of
the right times, in order to achieve the unbelievable and
astronomical profits so claimed.

Again, Respondent submits that

all of such evidence is nothing but speculation and conjecture,
and cannot possibly have solid evidence enough to be a foundation
for any damage award in any dollar amount.
The law cited with respect to the preceding claim applies
to this claim also, except that the Court should be

even~

stringent in its analysis when the claim resembles one for profits
expected of a new enterprise.

Intervenors had never engaged in

the commodities futures market in the past (Tr. 57).

The policy

of the law opposing such speculation is demonstrated in this
situation, for no solid basis exists upon which profits can be
predicted.

"All the authorities are unanimous in holding that

prospective profits to be derived from a business which is not yet
established but one merely in contemplation are generally too
uncertain and speculative to form a basis for recovery.•

v. Morgan, 123 Utah 488, 486, 260 P2d 532, 535 (1953)

Jenkins

(evidence of

damages for loss of use of land for farming purposes considered
too speculative and uncertain to constitute basis for award).
~ccord,

Sims v. Western Steel Company, 403 F. Supp. 450, 454 (D.

Utah 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1975)
(patent licensor allowed damages for lost prospective profits due
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to breach of licensing agreement.

On appeal, no evidence of

injury or damage was found, and liability for the breach was
reversed), and Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d
468, 471 (1964)

(damages for anticipated profits from ranch

disallowed as speculative and uncertain).
A court in another jurisdiction, in a case involving
speculation profits, held:

"But lost profits must be proved with

reasonable certainty; damages which are remote and speculative
cannot be recovered (citations omitted) where a plaintiff is
conducting a new business with costs unknown, prospective prof its
cannot be awarded."
228, 230 (1974)

O'Brien v. Larson, 11 Wash. App. 52, 521 P.2d

The idea of investing in the commodity futures

market is clearly a new business for Intervenors, and under no
circumstances can such prospective profits, let alone
unconscionably high profits, be awarded.
Damages should not be awarded under this claim because
any damages sought would be utterly speculative and unconscionable.
E.

Failure to Award Sufficient Attorneys Fees

The trial court awarded the intervenor $10,000.00
in attorneys fees, and $2,000.00 in prejudgment interest.
Intervenors' counsel seeks an additur of $67,420.46.

He bases

this claim for additional attorneys fees on the case of Pacific
Coast Title Insurance Company v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company, 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1958), which counsel
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improperly interprets to say that "attorneys fees should be
treated as the legal consequences of the original wrongful act
and may be recovered as damages"

(P. 28 of Intervenors' brief).

As to the claim that this Court held in Pacific coast
Title that attorneys fees should be treated as the legal
consequences of the original act and are recoverable, Chief
Justice Crockett in a concurring opinion in a later case stated,
It has been consistently declared in our cases
over the years that attorney's fees cannot be
awarded except in three instances: as provided
by statute, or as agreed by contract, or where
it is a legitimate item of damage resulting from
a wrongful act.
(cite to Pacific Coast Title)
Capson v. Brisbois, 592 P.2d 583, 586 (Utah 1979).
Judge Crockett then added, in defining a "legitimate item":
(speaking of an interpleader action) [I]f the
court is convinced that the ends of justice so
require, he may award reasonable and necessary
attorney's fees. However, that should be done
only when such an award comes within the
standard rule for awarding damages: i.e. those
damages which should reasonably have been
foreseen would result from the wrongful conduct.
592 P.2d at 586.
From the reading of both Pacific Coast Title and Capson,
a two dimensional test appears of whether attorney's fees should
~

awarded
1.

Is this a legitimate item of damage
resulting from a wrongful act?
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2.

Are the attorneys fees damages that should
have been reaonsably foreseen as a result
of the wrongful conduct?

The situation at hand presents some interesting matters
of interpretation.

First, the Bank's act was not •wrongful".

Secondly, the attorneys fees sought by Intervenors were extremely
unreasonable.

The attorney for Intervenors sought $75.00 per hour

for non courtroom work and $100.00 per hour for courtroom work;
both of these figures are well in excess of what a small law firm
in the city of Provo would charge during the years involved.
Interestingly enough, of the $67,420.46 asked for by Intervenors'
lawyer, only $1,251.70 was actually paid by Intervenors between
the years of 1972 and 1975 (Exhibit A-21).

Where such generous

and expensive attorney's fees are claimed, the court can only
speculate as to why such were not billed to or paid by the client
in the relevant years.
In conclusion, this Court may not award attorneys fees as
damages, because it was not reasonably foreseeable to the Bank
that an attachment would result in litigation and consequent
attorneys fees, the Bank's attachment was not a wrongful act, and
the attorneys fees sought as damages are highly unreasonable.
F.

Additur For Damages Due to Anxiety, Embarrassment,
Worry & Concern

Intervenors ask for an additur in the sum of $50,000.00
plus prejudgment interest of $22,500.00 in this claim.

Inter-

-34Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ienors contend that they suffered humiliation in their small town
because of the after-effects of the alleged wrongful attachment.
In addition they have suffered anxiety evidenced by sleepless
nights over the last few years as a result of the actions of a
'large, powerful national bank•.
The issue of whether damages can be awarded for anxiety,
etc., turns on the question of whether the acts of the Bank can be
termed as wrongful, which in turn depends upon whether the court
finds that a wrongful attachment took place.

Again, this issue

was addressed at length in First Security's brief to the court as
appellant in case No. 17270.
Intervenors claim that the cases of Deevy v. Tossi, 21
C.2d 109, 130 P2d 389 (1942), and Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores,
197

s.c.

263, 15 S.E. 2d 353 (1941), allow damages for mental

anguish without showing malice or ill-will.

Deevy involved an

action for malicious assault and battery, and certainly doesn't
stand for what Intervenors claim.

In Hyde, malice was an issue,

contrary to Intervenors' claim, but was a jury question.

The

court in Hyde said:
•Malice may be inferred from the want of
probable cause1 it may be inferred from facts
and circumstances. Probable cause is said to
consist in a reasonable belief in the existence
of facts necessary to sustain an attachment,
such belief being founded on circumstances which
would be sufficient to produce such a belief in
a man of ordinary caution, that is, founded upon
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reasonable grounds • • . Under the admitted
facts, the question of malice and probable cause
was properly left to the jury (emphasis added).
15 S.E. 2d at 359.
It is obvious that the Bank had probable cause to attach
the cattle.

The Bank had no desire or intent to inflict tortious

damages on anyone at the time of the attachment.

It was

thoroughly convinced that the cattle attached were those under the
security interest from J.B.J. Feedyards, and no other possiblity
seemed plausible.
The anxiety complained of by Intervenors did not create
any actual damages and, in any event, was not proximately caused
by the Bank.

Such anxiety, not resulting from an intentional

tort, nor from any wrongful act whatever, was remote from the good
faith actions taken by the Bank, and is of such uncertain and
speculative nature as to be outside the scope of permissible
damages in this case.
G.

Additional Punitive Damages

Intervenors rely heavily on the finding of the trial
court regarding the attachment, the very foundation of which is
questioned in case No. 17270.

Intervenors then emphasize

melodramatically the great wealth of First Security and demand an
addition of $400,000.00 and prejudgment interest of $180,000.00,
to the existing damage award of $143,101.48 of the trial court.
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The standard for awarding punitive damages in the courts
of Utah is set forth in Paombi v. D&C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297,
452 P.2d 325, 328 (1969), •In order to justify their imposition it
must appear, not only that there was a wrongful invasion of the
plaintiff's rights, but that it was done willfully and
maliciously" (emphasis added).

Accord, Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah

2d 152, 374 P.2d 380 (1963); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1975).

Malice in the context as a prerequisite for an award

of punitive damages has been defined in the following way.
Malice as a basis
intentional doing
cause or excuse.
not only intended
ascertained to be
was wrong when he

for punitive damages means the
of a wrongful act without just
This means that the defendant
to do the act which is
wrongful, but that he knew it
did it.

Loucks v. Alberquerque National Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191,
199 (1966).

Malice has also been defined as •the motive and

willingness to vex, harass, annoy, or injure".

Haun v. Hyman, 223

C.A. 2d 615, 36 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1964)
In order to award punitive damages, actual malice, not
just legal or implied malice, must be present.

An Ohio case,

Columbus Finance Inc. v. Howard, 38 Ohio App. 2d 7, 311 N.E 2d 32
(1973), involving an action for wrongful attachment, stated:
In tort actions the question of punitive damages
may not ordinarily be submitted to a jury in the
absence of actual malice.
(emphasis added)
The court in Columbus then went on to say:
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Thus, ordinarily, proof of only legal malice is
not sufficient to justify an award for punitive
damages but, rather, actual malice must be
proved before punitive or exemplary damages may
be awarded. Legal malice and actual malice are
not synonomous.
(emphasis added).
311 N.E. at 35.
The Columbus court then cited the case of Pickle v. Swinehart, 170
Ohio St. 441, 166 N.E. 2d 227 (1960), for a definition of "actual
malice 0

•

Actual or express malice has been defined as
that state of mind under which a person's
conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will,
a spirit of revenge, retaliation or a
determination to vent his feelings upon other
persons.
311 N.E. 2d at 35.
Intervenors have not even remotely shown that the Bank's
conduct was malicious and willful, let alone the even more
stringent standard of actual malice, "that state of mind under
which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will,
a spirit of revenge, retaliation or a determination to vent his
feelings upon other persons."

Quite to the contrary, First

Security has taken great pains to show in its appellant's brief
in Case No. 17270 that its actions were actuated by an abundance
of probable cause, good faith and lack of malicious intent
(p. 7-15).

Moreover, punitive damages should be granted with great
caution.
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[T)he purposes of punitive damages • • • are: a
punishment of the defendant for particularly
grevious injury caused by conduct which is not
only wrongful, but which is willful and
malicious so that it seems to one's sense of
justice that mere recompense for actual loss is
inadequate and that the plaintiff should have
added compensation; and that the defendant
should suffer some additional penalty for that
character of wrongful conduct; and also that
such a verdict should serve as a wholesome
warning to others not to engage in similar
misdoings • • • [T)his is an extraordinary
remedy • . • [I)t should be applied with caution
lest, engendered by passion or prejudice because
of defendant's wrongdoint, the award becomes
unrealistic or unreasona le • • •
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975).
An award of punitive damages must not be the result of
passion and prejudice.

Intervenors' brief is replete with

passion-filled pleas for punitive damages (page 32).

The pleas

are not based on facts in the record.
In addition, there must be some sort of correlation
between the actual damages and the punitive damages award.

The

actual damages awarded at trial, excluding interest and attorneys
fees, was $165,506.56.

The trial court awarded $100,000.00 in

punitive damages, nearly 60\ of actual damages, this is clearly
excessive.

Intervenors ask for an additional $723,101.48 in

punitive damages which is over 430\ of actual damages, found by
the trial court 1
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Intervenors rely on two Utah cases that hold that the
wrongdoer's wealth is a factor and can be examined in reaching a
punitive damage award.

The action in Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314

(Utah 1979), was one for malicious prosecution, false arrest and
false imprisonment arising from an alleged shoplifting incident.
The plaintiff sought, along with other damages, punitive damages
of $15,000.00.

The jury awarded actual damages and $15,000.00 for

punitive damages.

The trial judge refused to grant $15,000.00 for

punitive damages declaring them excessive, and found that
$2,000.00 would be more appropriate.

The plaintiffs appealed the

judges award of $2,000.00 for punitive damages to the Utah Supreme
Court, whereupon the Court held that $15,000.00 was reasonable and
that the wealth of the defendant is a factor to be looked at.
Even with that precedent, Intervenors' claim of over $723,000.00
is astoundingly excessive, especially where the lack of malice is
evident.
The punitive damages sought by Intervenors are based on,
according to their brief, •uncontroverted facts" and •unequivocal
facts".

However, most if not all are disputable, or have been

neutralized by the probable cause and good faith actions of the
Bank.
In conclusion, punitive damages can only be awarded when
there is a wrongful act, willfully and maliciously performed by
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the wrongdoer.

The Bank has carefully established that its

actions were prompted by an abundance of probable cause and good
faith, not at all motivated by hatred or ill-feeling toward the
Intervenors.
H.

The denial of this claim must be affirmed.
Pre-Judgment Interest

In the trial court below, the judge awarded pre-judgment
interest to all five

(5)

items of damage granted.

Intervenors

seek additional prejudgment interest.
The law in Utah regarding prejudgment interest would
require a denial of all such prejudgment interest.
"The law in Utah is clear, • • • where the
damage is complete and the amount of the loss is
fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can
be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time and not from
the date of judgment. On the other hand, where
damages are incomplete or cannot be calcul~
with mathematical accuracy, such as in case of
personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of
character, false imprisonment, etc. the amount
of damage must be ascertained and assessed by
the trier of fact at the trial and in such cases
prejudgment interest is not allowed (emphasis
added).
Bjork v. April Industries Inc., 560 P2d 315 (Utah 1977).
All of the damages awarded were totally in the control
of the trier of fact, and incapable of being calculated with
mathematical accuracy.

Therefore, under the test as outlined

above in Bjork, it is clear that interest should not have been
allowed on any of the Intervenors' claims until the date of
judgment.
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I.

Commentary On Legal Precedents

Respondent First Security is reluctant, but in candor and
good conscience required, to observe for the benefit of the Court
that Intervenors' brief is replete with serious erros in legal
citations.

For example, pages 23 and 234 contain purported

quotations from six cases.

Yet not one of those quotations

actually appears in the cited court decisions!

Moreover, the

Pacific Reporter citations on Gould and Stewart are not correct.
It appears to the Respondent that the lack of care and diligence
in presenting evidence in the trial court is continued in the lack
of care with respect to legal precedents cited to the court.
These factors combine to persuade the Court that Intervenors'
claims here under appeal are not well founded in any degree,
legally or factually.
CONCLUSION
Respondent First Security moves this Court to affirm all
portions of the lower court judgment which denied the additional
claims for damages sought by Intervenors, for the reasons argued
at length in this brief.
Respectfully Submitted,

~'
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Don B. Allen and
Patrick B. Nolan of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-1500
Attorneys for Respondent
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of March, 1981,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to Thomas S. Taylor,
Attorney for Intervenors, 55 East Center Street, Provo, Utah
84601.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

